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O
ver the past decade, the level of required
reserve balances held by depository
institutions in the United States has
declined dramatically. Indeed, most depository
institutions can now meet reserve requirements
by holding vault cash rather than by maintaining
balances at the Federal Reserve. Part of this
decrease resulted from the Federal Reserve’s
decision to reduce reserve requirements in 1990
and 1992 to reduce bank costs and stimulate
lending. More recently, depository institutions
have been able to cut required balances even
further by sweeping funds from reservable to
nonreservable accounts, circumventing reserve
requirement regulations.
The decline in reserve balances has fueled a
debate over the role of reserve requirements. On
the one hand, proponents of reserve requirements
argue that low reserve balances may complicate
monetary policy operations and increase short-
term interest rate volatility. Thus, they advocate
the Federal Reserve take actions to stop the
continuing erosion of reserve balances. On the
other hand, critics of reserve requirements argue
that lower reserve requirements remove a distor-
tionary tax on depository institutions and need
not complicate monetary policy operations.
In a previous article, we provided an analyti-
cal framework for thinking about these issues
(Sellon and Weiner). That article suggested that
monetary policy can be conducted in a world of
low or zero reserve requirements as long as there
continues to be a demand for central bank bal-
ances. Such demand is likely to arise from the
need of financial institutions to hold central
bank balances for settlement purposes and to
transact business with the government. The demand
for settlement balances is likely to be behaviorally
different from the demand for reserves, however,
leading to two potential problems for monetary
policy operations. First, because the demand for
central bank balances arises from payments needs
rather than from a mandated linkage to deposit
liabilities, the structure of the payments system
becomes an important factor in the design and
implementation of monetary policy operating
procedures. Consequently, changes in the pay-
ments system may affect the demand for settle-
ment balances and complicate monetary policy.
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Reserve System.Second, short-term interest rate volatility could
increase as reserve requirements decline if the
demand for central bank balances becomes more
difficult to forecast or if the interest sensitivity
of this demand is reduced. Increased interest rate
volatility would be of concern to the extent it had
negative effects on economic activity.
While these potential problems are valid in
theory, it is not clear how important they are in
practice. To judge their practical importance, in
this article we examine how three countries—
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zea-
land—conduct monetary policy without using
reserve requirements. The experience of these
three countries provides insight into the linkages
between the payments system and monetary pol-
icy and into the connection between reserve
requirements and interest rate volatility. This
insight is particularly helpful in understanding
the implications of a further reduction of reserve
balances in the United States.  The analysis sug-
gests that reserve requirements are not essential
for the conduct of U.S. monetary policy pro-
vided the Federal Reserve is sufficiently flexible
in modifying existing mechanisms for providing
liquidity to the banking system. 
This article has four main sections. The first
section reviews the implications of declining
reserve requirements for monetary policy. The
second section describes how the central banks
in Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zea-
land conduct monetary policy without reserve
requirements and examines the relationship
between the payments system and monetary
policy procedures. The third section uses the
experience of these three countries to analyze
the connection between reserve requirements
and interest rate volatility. The final section
draws implications for the United States and
discusses some of the options open to U.S. policy-
makers in addressing the declining effectiveness
of reserve requirements.
I. DECLINING RESERVE BALANCES:
ANALYTICAL ISSUES
Over the years, the role of reserve require-
ments as a monetary policy instrument has
diminished. In the United States, as in many
other countries, reserve balances have declined
as reserve requirements have been cut and as
financial institutions have attempted to mini-
mize the costs of holding reserves. Operating in
a world with low reserve requirements, how-
ever, raises important conceptual and practical
issues for central banks.
The declining importance of reserve
requirements
In the United States and many other countries,
banks and other depository institutions are re-
quired to maintain a fraction of their deposit
liabilities in the form of reserves—balances held
at the central bank or vault cash held at the
institution.
1 Generally, depository institutions
do not have to meet reserve requirements on a
daily basis but only, on average, over a period of
one or more weeks.
2 Like many central banks,
the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on
reserve balances. Thus, to the extent that reserve
requirements force depository institutions to hold
higher balances than necessary for normal busi-
ness purposes, reserve requirements constitute a
tax on depository institutions.
While reserve requirements are seen as a bur-
den by depository institutions, historically central
banks have viewed reserve requirements as an
important instrument of monetary policy. Tradi-
tionally, reserve requirements have been viewed
as a means for a central bank to limit the amount
of credit extended by banks or growth in the
money supply. 
The role of reserve requirements in monetary
policy has changed in recent years, however, as
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYmany central banks have abandoned operating
procedures designed to control reserve or money
growth and instead have emphasized control of
short-term interest rates. Under such an interest
rate operating procedure, reserve requirements
may still be useful to the extent that they help
stabilize the demand for reserves. This point is
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the market
for reserves. The demand for reserves D is derived
from reserve requirements plus depository insti-
tutions’ desired holdings of excess reserves.
The supply of reserves S is determined by central
bank actions to supply reserves through open
market operations and its discount or lending
facility and by nonpolicy factors affecting reserve
supply. In this framework, the central bank is
able to control the short-term interest rate r by
altering the amount of reserves it supplies to
institutions so as to offset the effects of shifts in
reserve demand and in nonpolicy factors that
shift reserve supply. To accomplish this, how-
ever, the central bank needs to be able to forecast
both the demand for reserves and the nonpolicy
factors affecting reserve supply. Reserve require-
ments may be useful in the implementation of
monetary policy insofar as they help produce a
more stable or more predictable demand for
reserves (Weiner 1992). 
Many central banks have begun to weigh the
smaller monetary policy role of reserve require-










ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 7institutions. In the United States and a number
of other countries, reserve requirements have been
lowered, and several countries have eliminated
reserve requirements altogether (Bank of Japan).
In addition, the effectiveness of reserve require-
ments has been eroded by financial innovations
that reduce the amount of reserve balances that
depository institutions are required to hold. In
the United States, over the past three years,
depository institutions have substantially reduced
reserve balances by “sweeping” funds from
reservable deposit accounts to nonreservable
deposit accounts.
3 As a result, reserve balances
at the Federal Reserve have fallen to their lowest
level in 30 years, and most depository institu-
tions can now meet their reserve requirements
by holding vault cash rather than by maintaining
reserve balances at the Federal Reserve.
Monetary policy implications of lower
reserve requirements
Although reserve requirements have become
a less important policy instrument, it would be
a mistake to conclude that the disappearance of
reserve requirements has no implications for
monetary policy. Indeed, in a world in which
reserve requirements are low enough to be non-
binding or even zero, central banks face important
conceptual and practical issues in implementing
monetary policy.
The main conceptual issue concerns the nature
of the demand for central bank balances in the
absence of reserve requirements. Without reserve
requirements, depository institutions are likely
to continue to hold balances at the central bank
in order to settle interbank payments and to carry
out transactions with the government. In the
framework shown in Figure 1, there will still be
a demand curve, but it will now represent a
demand for settlement balances rather than a
demand for reserve balances. However, this
demand for settlement balances is likely to be
behaviorally different from the demand for
reserve balances. Indeed, the demand for settle-
ment balances is mainly determined by institu-
tional features of the payments system that
affect the timing of payments. In contrast, in a
world with reserve requirements, the demand
for reserve balances depends mainly on the level
of reservable deposits held by an institution,
which may bear little relationship to payments
needs.
4
These differences have two important practi-
cal implications for monetary policy. First, in a
system with low or zero reserve requirements,
monetary policy operating procedures are likely
to be more closely linked to the structure of the
payments system because the demand for settle-
ment balances depends largely on payments
needs.
5 As a result, changes in institutional
aspects of the payments system may influence
the demand for settlement balances, affecting
the central bank’s ability to forecast this demand
and complicating the implementation of policy.
For example, a technological improvement in
institutions’ ability to monitor their settlement
balances could reduce their need for settlement
balances and make it more difficult to forecast
this demand.
6 
A second implication of lower reserve require-
ments for monetary policy is the potential
increase in the volatility of short-term interest
rates. Such volatility may be important to the
extent it is transmitted to longer term rates and
has a negative effect on the real economy. Short-
term interest rate volatility could rise as reserve
balances fall if the demand for central bank
balances becomes more difficult to forecast.
Interest rate volatility could also rise if the de-
mand for central bank balances becomes less
sensitive to interest rates. In this situation,
errors in forecasting demand or nonpolicy sup-
ply factors would result in greater interest rate
variability (Sellon and Weiner). 
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYII. OPERATING WITHOUT RESERVE
REQUIREMENTS: CASE STUDIES
While these concerns about the monetary policy
implications of low reserve requirements are
valid in theory, it is not clear how important they
are in practice. One way to judge their importance
is to look at how other countries conduct monetary
policy without relying on reserve requirements.
The experience of three countries—Canada, the
United Kingdom, and New Zealand—illustrates
that reserve requirements are not essential to the
implementation of monetary policy and, at the
same time, highlights the connection between
the payments system and monetary policy in a
world without reserve requirements.
CANADA
In Canada, the current framework for imple-
menting monetary policy was introduced with
the full elimination of reserve requirements in
1994. Prospective changes in the Canadian
large-dollar payments system, scheduled for
late 1997, will require significant changes in
these procedures.
Current system
In Canada, the decision to eliminate reserve
requirements was largely motivated by the dis-
torting effects of reserve requirements on the
financial system (Clinton 1997, Montador).
Because they applied only to banks, reserve
requirements were seen as a differential and
unnecessary tax on the banking system. In addi-
tion, as in the United States, the effectiveness of
reserve requirements was being eroded by finan-
cial innovation. The elimination of reserve
requirements in Canada was authorized by the
1991 Bank Act, and a phaseout of reserve
requirements began in June 1992 (Clinton 1997).
Reserve requirements were fully eliminated in
June 1994.
The basic strategy for implementing monetary
policy in Canada centers on the Bank of Canada’s
control of the supply of settlement balances to
affect overnight interest rates. Desired settings
for the overnight rate are derived from objec-
tives for short-term interest rates and the exchange
rate that are thought to be consistent with the
long-run objective of price stability.
7
Generally speaking, a central bank’s ability to
influence overnight rates depends heavily on
how well it can forecast the demand for settle-
ment balances. It must be able to forecast
demand in order to determine how much to
adjust the supply of balances to achieve a
desired interest rate.
8 Thus, a key element in this
framework is the existence of a well-defined
demand for settlement balances. 
In Canada, the demand for settlement balances
is determined by the need for banks to hold
funds at the Bank of Canada, which in turn
depends on institutional features of the Cana-
dian payments system and on rules and incen-
tives to hold settlement balances that are set by
the Bank of Canada. Unlike the United States
with its large number of banking organizations,
in Canada there is a relatively small number of
settlement institutions. There are currently 12
bank and nonbank direct clearers that are re-
quired to settle their transactions on the books
of the Bank of Canada. The key institutional
feature shaping their demand for settlement bal-
ances is that payments made during the day clear
overnight. Settlement occurs the following
morning but is backdated to the previous day. 
This retroactive feature has two implications
for the demand for settlement balances by direct
clearers. First, retroactive settlement creates un-
certainty for an institution about its final settle-
ment balance position. Second, at the time its
settlement position is known, it is too late for the
institution to adjust its position further. If the
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 9institution has a negative balance, its only option
is to borrow funds from the Bank of Canada.
9 If
it has a positive balance, it incurs a cost in terms
of interest foregone.
In Canada, the existence of a well-defined
demand for settlement balances stems from the
uncertainty created by the retroactive nature of
the settlement system and from the Bank of
Canada’s ability to affect the opportunity cost of
holding settlement balances. While there is no
reserve requirement for direct clearers, holding
either a positive or a negative position entails
a cost, which creates an incentive for an institu-
tion to target a zero balance. These costs stem
from two requirements. One, institutions with a
negative balance on any day are required to take
a collateralized loan from the Bank of Canada
and pay the published Bank Rate, which is
aligned with prevailing short-term money mar-
ket rates. Two, institutions with a negative
cumulative position over a monthly averaging
period are required to take a collateralized loan
at the Bank Rate or pay a fee in lieu of the loan.
Although clearing institutions are penalized for
daily or period overdrafts, they receive no inter-
est on positive settlement balances. The combi-
nation of the average settlement balance
requirement, the fee on overdrafts, and the non-
payment of interest on positive balances creates
a system in which clearing institutions will
have a well-defined demand for settlement bal-
ances which aids the Bank of Canada in achiev-
ing its overnight interest rate objective (Clinton
1997).
10
At the time reserve requirements were elimi-
nated, the Bank of Canada also made changes to
its operating procedures to improve the effi-
ciency and transparency of its policy actions.
The principal change was the introduction of an
explicit operating band for the overnight rate as
a means of clarifying its desired target for the
overnight rate. This band, which is made public,
permits the overnight rate to fluctuate within a
range of 50 basis points. 
The Bank of Canada implements policy by
choosing a target for the overnight rate within
the operating band. The Bank attempts to achieve
this target principally by engaging in repurchase
agreements during the day to maintain the over-
night rate within the band. When rates threaten
to move above the upper limit of the operating
range, the Bank can conduct Special Purchase
and Resale Agreements (SPRAs) to temporarily
increase the supply of settlement balances. Simi-
larly, Sale and Repurchase Agreements (SRAs)
can be used to absorb settlement balances to
prevent the overnight rate from falling below the
lower limit of the operating band.
11
In addition, the Bank of Canada uses its con-
trol over government deposits on its books to
affect the supply of settlement balances.
12 For
example, if increased demand for settlement
balances threatens to push the overnight rate
above the target, the Bank will transfer govern-
ment deposits from its books to the clearing
banks. This transaction increases the supply of
settlement balances and reduces the upward
pressure on the overnight rate.
13 The combina-
tion of repurchase agreements and transfers of
government balances allows the Bank of Can-
ada to maintain the overnight rate within the
operating band.
The overall effectiveness of this system in
maintaining close control over the overnight
rate is illustrated in Chart 1. Since 1994, the
Bank of Canada has been very successful in main-
taining the overnight rate within its announced
operating band without relying on reserve
requirements. 
Prospective changes
When the current Canadian system was devel-
10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYoped, it was recognized that changes in the
structure of the payments system would require
changes in monetary policy operating proce-
dures. With the scheduled introduction of the
Large-Value Transfer System (LVTS) in late
1997, the Bank of Canada has indicated that it
will alter its framework for implementing mone-
tary policy (Bank of Canada, Clinton 1997).
From a monetary policy standpoint, the key
feature of the LVTS is it will eliminate all of the
present uncertainty about settlement balances
faced by clearing institutions. Institutions will
be able to track transactions on a real-time basis
throughout the day and will have the opportunity
to make final adjustments in their balances dur-
ing a presettlement period at the end of the day.
14
Consequently, the demand for settlement bal-
ances is likely to be fundamentally different than
under the current system. Indeed, under the
LVTS, direct clearers will be able to achieve a
zero balance position each day.  As a result, there
will be no need for a system of averaging in this
new framework. The Bank of Canada plans to
set the system supply of settlement balances
equal to zero each day using an afternoon auc-
tion of overnight government deposits. Once the
system supply is set at zero, clearing institutions
will be able to trade with each other to eliminate
any individual surplus or deficient balances. 
Without adjustments to monetary policy operat-
ing procedures, the overnight rate could become
quite volatile under the LVTS, since the rate will
Chart 1
















Source: Bank of Canada.




ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 11depend primarily on the daily distribution of
settlement balance excesses and deficiencies.
Thus, the Bank of Canada intends to change its
procedures for maintaining its operating band
for the overnight rate. Instead of using repur-
chase agreements during the day to enforce the
limits of the operating band as under current
operating procedures, the Bank will effectively
act as a residual supplier and purchaser of set-
tlement balances.
15 Clearing institutions with a
settlement balance deficiency at the end of the
day will be able to finance this deficiency by
obtaining a collateralized overdraft at the Bank
Rate. The Bank Rate will serve as the upper end
of the operating range for the overnight rate
since institutions would be unlikely to pay more
than the Bank Rate to secure additional settle-
ment balances.
16 Similarly, the Bank will pay
interest on positive balances held at the end of
the day at a rate 50 basis points below the Bank
Rate. This rate paid on settlement balances will
serve as the lower end of the operating range
since institutions would not accept a lower rate
on positive balances in the market. With these
changes, the Bank of Canada expects to be able
to continue to maintain close control over the
overnight rate.
UNITED KINGDOM
While Canada’s experience in implementing
monetary policy without reserve requirements
is relatively recent, the United Kingdom has
operated without binding reserve requirements
for more than a decade. As in Canada, monetary
policy operating procedures have undergone
recent changes.
The traditional policy framework
In the UK, reserve requirements have been
seen as a discriminatory tax that distorts finan-
cial intermediation (King). Thus, formal reserve
requirements, in the form of a “cash ratio deposit,”
were lowered over a period of years until they
were no longer binding on bank behavior. The
remaining requirement of 0.35 percent of depos-
its has no operational significance for monetary
policy and is viewed as a tax whose sole purpose
is to provide operating income for the Bank of
England.
The Bank of England implements monetary
policy by managing the supply of settlement
balances in the banking system so as to influence
short-term interest rates in a manner consistent
with a long-run goal of price stability. This gen-
eral approach to monetary policy is very similar
to that of the Bank of Canada. However, the
operating procedures employed by the Bank of
England are very different from those used by
the Bank of Canada. These differences reflect
both variation in the structures of financial insti-
tutions and markets in the two countries and
different choices made by the central banks in
operating methods.
In the UK, monetary policy has traditionally
worked through two types of financial institu-
tions. Settlement banks are large commercial
banks that are members of the wholesale clear-
ing associations. Discount houses are special-
ized institutions that operate in sterling money
markets and that, historically, have served as an
intermediary between the Bank of England and
the settlement banks. Until the recent changes in
money market operations (March 1997) dis-
cussed in the next subsection were made, the
Bank of England conducted open market opera-
tions and discount window lending primarily
through the discount houses so as to affect the
supply and cost of settlement balances to the
banking system.
Settlement banks in the UK must meet a daily
settlement balance requirement. They are required
to maintain a positive balance in their settlement
account at the Bank of England at the end of each
12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYbusiness day. Unlike the current Canadian sys-
tem, in the UK there is no averaging of balances.
In addition, settlement balances earn no interest.
Individual banks that face a prospective defi-
ciency or surplus in their end-of-day balance can
transact with other money market participants,
selling or buying assets, to adjust their settle-
ment balance. If there is a systemwide shortage
or surplus of settlement balances, the Bank of
England conducts open market operations or
lending operations to adjust the overall amount
of settlement balances.
The Bank of England uses its ability to man-
age the supply of settlement balances to influ-
ence short-term interest rates. The Bank of
England accomplishes this by creating a daily
shortage of settlement balances in the banking
system and then supplying additional funds
through open market operations and lending
operations. By controlling the price and terms
of access to these funds, the Bank can influence
money market rates. For example, under the old
system used prior to March 1997, a settlement
bank wishing to obtain additional balances
could withdraw secured deposits from a dis-
count house which could then sell assets to the
Bank of England during any one of three regu-
larly scheduled daily rounds of open market
operations. However, the Bank of England
restricts the types of assets that it will purchase
in an open market operation and determines the
rates at which it will conduct transactions.
Indeed, these “dealing rates” for conducting
open market transactions are the main policy
lever employed by the Bank of England to affect
money market rates.
17 By raising or lowering
these rates, the Bank influences the marginal
cost of settlement balances, pushing market
rates higher or lower.
While the Bank of England implements mone-
tary policy through its influence on money mar-
ket interest rates, it does not aim for the same
degree of control over short-term rates as in
Canada. For example, the Bank of England has
no explicit target or operating band for interest
rates and conducts open market operations in a
variety of short-term maturities (King). Despite
the lack of formal interest rate targets, however,
the Bank of England has been successful in
operating monetary policy without relying on
reserve requirements. As illustrated in Chart 2,
the overnight rate, while quite volatile in the
short run, tends to track the Bank’s dealing rate
quite closely over a longer period of time.
Recent changes in procedures
Over the past few years, the Bank of England
has made some important changes to improve
the efficiency of its operating procedures and to
adapt these procedures to changes in the pay-
ments system. Both types of changes are designed
to increase the liquidity of money markets.
In March 1997, the Bank of England intro-
duced major changes in its daily money market
operations (Bank of England 1997). Generally
speaking, these changes expand the flexibility
of open market and lending operations and are
a continuation of structural changes made over
the past several years.
18 One change is an expan-
sion of the range of instruments used in open
market operations. Historically, discount houses
who wished to obtain funds in open market
transactions were restricted to the use of Trea-
sury bills or certain eligible commercial bills.
19
In situations where the supply of these bills was
limited, the money market would experience
liquidity pressures as discount houses attempted
to obtain bills to sell to the Bank of England.
These liquidity pressures, at times, contributed
to increased interest rate volatility. By expand-
ing the range of instruments used in open market
operations to include both fixed-rate and vari-
able-rate repurchase agreements in government
securities (gilt repos), the Bank of England aims
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 13to reduce liquidity pressures associated with the
limited availability of eligible bills.
In addition to expanding the range of assets
used in open market operations, the Bank of
England has also enlarged the set of counterpar-
ties in open market operations and discount win-
dow lending. The Bank now conducts daily open
market operations with institutions other than
the discount houses and provides late-day lending
assistance directly to settlement banks.
20 These
actions are also designed to improve the effi-
ciency of money markets by increasing market
liquidity.
As in Canada, changes in the payments system
in the UK have also had implications for mone-
tary policy. In 1996, the UK implemented a real
time gross settlement (RTGS) payments system
aimed at reducing intraday credit exposures in
the large-dollar payments system. RTGS lowers
credit risk by requiring that funds be available
to cover a transaction before a transaction is
completed. Such a system can place enormous
demands on intraday liquidity, however. These
demands may be difficult to meet in a system
with low reserve requirements because the low
levels of settlement balances held to meet end-of-
day requirements may be insufficient to meet in-
traday liquidity requirements. As a result, the
Bank of England has developed an intraday repo
facility to meet intraday credit needs (Bank of
England 1994). Under this system, settlement
institutions can obtain additional settlement bal-
Chart 2
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14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYances on demand during the day by engaging in
collateralized repurchase agreements with the
Bank of England. No interest is charged on these
transactions, but the transactions must be unwound
by the end of the day to remove the excess
liquidity prior to end-of-day settlement.
21
As compared with Canada, payments system
changes in the UK have had a smaller effect
on monetary policy. In Canada, as discussed
above, the move from retroactive to same-day
settlement has had major implications for
operating procedures. In the UK, the introduc-
tion of RTGS has been structured to minimize
the implications for monetary policy. In princi-
ple, the provision of intraday liquidity under
RTGS could spill over into the overnight market
and affect a central bank’s ability to control
overnight liquidity and influence the over-
night rate. However, the intraday facility in the
UK was designed so that the provision of
intraday liquidity would not affect the Bank of
England’s leverage over short-term interest
rates (Dale and Rossi).
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand is a third country that has con-
ducted monetary policy without reserve require-
ments for a number of years. As in Canada and
the United Kingdom, monetary policy operating
procedures in New Zealand are currently under-
going significant changes.
Current procedures
Reserve requirements were eliminated in New
Zealand in the mid-1980s as part of a set of
larger policy initiatives designed to increase the
efficiency of the economy by reducing distor-
tions caused by taxes and government regula-
tion (Evans and others). Thus, as in Canada and
the UK, reserve requirements in New Zealand
were seen as imposing a significant cost on
financial institutions while, at the same time,
having little operational use in monetary policy.
The general approach to monetary policy in
New Zealand is broadly similar to that in Canada
and the UK. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand
uses its control over the supply of settlement
balances to influence interest rates and exchange
rates in a manner consistent with a goal of main-
taining price stability. As compared with the
other two countries, however, New Zealand
operating procedures are more quantity-oriented
and place less emphasis on the control of short-
term interest rates.
In New Zealand, the focal point of monetary
policy operations is the amount of settlement
balances or “settlement cash” held at the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (Huxford and Reddell).
Most banks choose to hold balances at the
Reserve Bank in order to clear directly transac-
tions with the government and the Reserve Bank
and to settle interbank transactions. If a bank has
a settlement account, the Reserve Bank requires
that this account have a nonnegative balance at
the end of the day. This daily balance require-
ment, similar to that in the UK, gives the central
bank leverage over short-term interest rates. By
controlling both the supply of settlement bal-
ances relative to the demand and the opportunity
cost of holding these balances, the Reserve Bank
can influence short-term rates.
To implement policy, the Reserve Bank uses
open market operations to achieve a target level
of settlement cash balances. This target is set so
that errors in forecasting settlement balances
will lead the banking system occasionally to
face a prospective shortage. In this situation, the
Reserve Bank is the only source of additional
balances. To obtain these balances, however,
banks must sell a special asset called “Reserve
Bank bills” to the Reserve Bank and pay a penalty
rate for these funds.
22 The combination of a
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penalty rate on additional settlement balances
causes banks to attempt to fund settlement balance
deficiencies in the money market, transmitting
settlement balance pressures to market interest
rates. At the same time, the Reserve Bank pays
interest on positive settlement balances held at
the end of the day. However, this rate is set
sufficiently below market rates that banks have
an incentive to dispose of excess balances in the
money market, rather than relying on the Reserve
Bank’s payment of interest.
23
In this framework, when the Reserve Bank
feels that a change in monetary policy is war-
ranted, it can alter the settlement cash target or
issue public statements of its intentions. Thus,
for example, a lowering of the settlement cash
target will increase the likelihood that banks will
face a settlement balance deficiency, placing
upward pressure on market rates. Similarly, an
increase in the cash target will place downward
pressure on rates. 
24 In recent years, the Reserve
Bank has also placed increased emphasis on
public statements to convey its policy intent.
These statements plus the publication of the
Reserve Bank’s own inflation projections and
desired conditions for short-term interest rates
and exchange rates convey changes in the stance
of monetary policy to financial markets.
Prospective changes
As in Canada and the UK, ongoing institu-
tional changes in the New Zealand payments
system have implications for monetary policy
operating procedures. In addition, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand has recently undertaken a
comprehensive review of is procedures for imple-
menting monetary policy. If proposed changes are
adopted, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand will
move away from implementing policy through
a settlement cash target in favor of an explicit
operating band for interest rates.
25
One important institutional change in New
Zealand is the introduction of a real time gross
settlement (RTGS) system for the large-dollar
payments system. As in the UK, adoption of
RTGS in a system without reserve requirements
will increase intraday liquidity pressures. Like
the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand plans to respond by introducing an
intraday repurchase facility so that banks can
obtain additional funds in their settlement
accounts as needed during the day. This change
is expected to prevent intraday liquidity pres-
sures from affecting the volatility of overnight
and other short-term rates.
26
More fundamental changes in monetary
policy operating procedures may also be forth-
coming.
27 The Reserve Bank has recently pro-
posed replacing much of the institutional
framework used to target settlement cash bal-
ances with a framework relying on an explicit
target range for the overnight cash rate. This
proposed system has many similarities to the
new framework to be used by the Bank of Can-
ada. The main feature of this new system would
be a target range of 20 to 50 basis points for the
overnight rate. The upper end of this range is the
rate at which the Reserve Bank would provide
additional settlement balances through repur-
chase agreements. The lower end of the range
would be the rate paid by the Reserve Bank on
settlement balances. Monetary policy would
operate, not by targeting the amount of settle-
ment cash balances, but by changing the cash
rate range to influence other short-term interest
rates and exchange rates. The Reserve Bank
believes that these changes are likely to in-
crease its leverage over short-term interest rates
and the efficiency and transparency of monetary
policy operations.  The Bank also feels that this
new framework provides administrative con-
venience in operating with a real time settlement
system.
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INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
One of the principal monetary policy issues
connected with reducing or eliminating reserve
requirements is whether interest rate volatility
would rise. Although previous research suggests
that volatility may be greater in countries with
low or nonbinding reserve requirements, an
examination of recent interest rate volatility in
Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand
suggests that there is no clear relationship
between reserve requirements and volatility.
Indeed, the experience of these three countries
suggests that interest rate volatility may depend
more on the mechanism for providing liquidity
to the settlement system than on the level of
reserve requirements.
Evidence on volatility
Volatility of short-term interest rates is a con-
cern to policymakers to the extent it is transmit-
ted to prices of longer term assets and has a
negative effect on economic activity. Volatility
of short-term rates may also complicate the abil-
ity of financial markets to discern the stance of
monetary policy.  In such circumstances, central
banks may want to explore ways of reducing or
limiting volatility.
Evidence that reserve requirements and interest
rate volatility may be related comes from both
casual observation and empirical studies. When
the Federal Reserve cut reserve requirements at
the end of 1990, for example, the volatility of the
federal funds rate rose sharply for several weeks
(Feinman). And, more recently, as sweep accounts
have further reduced reserve balances, intraday
volatility in the federal funds market appears to
have risen moderately (Bennett and Hilton).
Previous empirical studies have examined the
connection between reserve requirements and
interest rate volatility by comparing volatility
across countries with different levels of reserve
requirements. For example, Kasman compared
volatility of overnight rates in Switzerland, the
UK, Canada, the United States, Germany, and
Japan from 1988 to 1991. Kasman found a posi-
tive relationship between low reserve require-
ments and higher volatility across these countries.
Specifically, volatility was higher in countries
with low and nonbinding reserve requirements
(the UK and Switzerland) than in countries with
high levels of reserve requirements (Japan and
Germany). Kasman also noted an uptrend in
volatility in Canada and the United States, two
countries where the level of reserve balances
was declining. Ayuso, Haldane, and Restoy
found a similar relationship in comparing vola-
tility in the UK, Germany, France, and Spain
from 1988 to 1993. Both studies also found
evidence that volatility in the overnight market
was transmitted to longer term rates in some of
the countries examined. 
Recent data for Canada, the UK, and New
Zealand, however, suggest that the relationship
between reserve requirements and interest rate
volatility is not as clear cut. In all three coun-
tries, volatility was higher on average than in the
United States over the 1990-96 period, as shown
on the left side of Chart 3. But, a closer look at
annual averages over this period shows that
volatility in the three countries dropped sharply
toward the end of the period. Indeed, during
1996, all three countries experienced lower inter-
est rate volatility than the United States. These
results suggest that interest rate volatility depends
on factors other than reserve requirements and
indicate a need to reexamine the linkage be-




Interest rate volatility arises in the overnight
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 17market as institutions attempt to meet reserve
requirements or settlement balance requirements
by trying to fund account deficiencies or dispose
of account surpluses. Generally speaking, the
amount of volatility depends on two factors: the
size of the surplus/shortage for the system and
the institutional mechanisms for providing or
removing liquidity from the system.
29
The size of a daily surplus or shortage in the
settlement system depends, in large part, on the
central bank’s ability to estimate settlement bank
demand for settlement balances. For example, if
the central bank underestimates the demand for
settlement balances on a given day, it will tend
to supply too few balances and short-term rates
will tend to rise as institutions attempt to obtain
additional balances. 
The level of reserve requirements may influ-
ence volatility to the extent that it affects the
central bank’s ability to estimate the demand for
central bank balances. If there is no uncertainty
in demand, reserve requirements will have no
implications for volatility. To see this point,
consider two regimes: one in which there is a
binding reserve requirement that must be met on
a daily basis and a second in which there is no
reserve requirement but institutions must hold a
nonnegative daily settlement balance. Without
uncertainty, a given reserve deficiency will have
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18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYdeficiency of the same magnitude. That is, it
does not matter whether a $10 million shortage
results from a $10 million reserve deficiency
that must be funded that day or a $10 million
settlement balance deficiency that must be
funded that day.
If demand is uncertain, however, reserve
requirements may affect volatility to the extent
that they make it easier for the central bank to
forecast demand. As discussed earlier, the deter-
minants of the demand for reserve balances are
likely to be different from the determinants of
the demand for settlement balances. Reserve
requirements may reduce volatility if they im-
prove the central bank’s ability to forecast the
size of a daily surplus or shortage of central bank
balances. Conversely, the removal of reserve
requirements could lead to increased interest
rate volatility if the central bank has more diffi-
culty in forecasting the demand for settlement
balances.
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The second factor affecting volatility is the set
of mechanisms that a central bank adopts for
resolving daily deficiencies or surpluses in cen-
tral bank balances. Generally speaking, these
mechanisms affect volatility by altering the
interest sensitivity of the demand for or supply
of central bank balances. 
One way of reducing daily liquidity pres-
sures and lowering volatility is to introduce
averaging of balance requirements over a period
of time. Averaging reduces volatility to the
extent that it allows an institution to spread a
daily surplus or deficiency over time. For
example, instead of purchasing funds in the
market to fund a daily deficiency, under averag-
ing, an institution can offset the deficiency by
holding a surplus in the future. The implica-
tions of averaging for volatility are illustrated
in Figure 2. In the absence of averaging, the
demand for central bank balances is likely to be
insensitive to interest rates as shown by the
vertical demand curve D. In contrast, a system
of averaging has the general effect of making
the demand for central bank balances more
interest sensitive D¢. With a flatter demand
curve, errors in forecasting demand or supply
have a smaller impact on interest rates and
volatility is reduced.
31 In considering the role
of averaging, it is important to recognize that
averaging can be used either with reserve re-
quirements, as in the United States, or without
reserve requirements, as in Canada. Thus, the
benefits of averaging in reducing interest rate
volatility can be obtained independently of the
existence of reserve requirements.
32
Interest rate volatility will also depend on how
central banks provide liquidity through open
market operations and through discount or lend-
ing facilities. The structure of open market and
lending facilities will determine the slope of the
supply curve for central bank balances shown in
Figure 3. If restrictions are placed on the ability
of a settlement institution to access these facili-
ties, the supply curve will tend to be steeper S,
resulting in greater interest rate volatility for
errors in forecasting the demand for balances or
nonpolicy factors affecting supply. Alterna-
tively, if the central bank provides or absorbs
funds on demand, the price charged will set a
ceiling or floor on the overnight rate because
institutions would not be likely to borrow at a
higher price or lend at a lower price than that set
by the central bank. Thus, for example, the cen-
tral bank could set a lending rate that was some-
what higher than that paid on settlement
balances, resulting in a band or corridor in which
the overnight rate would fluctuate as shown in
Figure 4.
33 In the limiting case, if the central
bank were to provide or absorb funds at a single
rate, the supply curve would be horizontal S¢, as
shown in Figure 3, and interest rate volatility
would be eliminated. 
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This framework can be used to explain some
of the stylized facts about interest rate volatility
in Canada, the UK, and New Zealand described
above. Indeed, in all three countries, the observed
behavior of volatility appears to be more closely
related to the mechanism for providing liquidity
than on the absence of reserve requirements.
As discussed above, the elimination of reserve
requirements could lead to greater interest rate
volatility if the demand for settlement balances
is more difficult to forecast than the demand for
reserves. This could be a significant factor in
situations in which the central bank must monitor
a large number of institutions or, perhaps, in
a period of transition to a regime of lower reserve
requirements. It is not clear that this is an impor-
tant factor in Canada, the UK, and New Zea-
land, however, because of the relatively small
number of settlement institutions in these three
countries.
34
A more important factor behind the behavior
of volatility in these three countries may be the
institutional structures for providing liquidity.
The low level of volatility in Canada, for exam-
ple, is likely due to a combination of the aver-
aging system for settlement balances and the
operating bands for the overnight rate. As dis-
cussed earlier, in Canada, direct clearers do not
have to meet a daily settlement balance require-
ment but are permitted to average daily sur-
pluses and deficiencies over a 30-day period.










20 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYliquidity pressures and reducing volatility by
making the demand for settlement balances more
interest sensitive. The use of an operating band
for the overnight rate also reduces volatility in
Canada. Under the current operating procedures,
the Bank of Canada uses open market operations
in the form of repurchase agreements to provide
or absorb liquidity when the overnight rate
threatens to move outside of the operating band.
Interest rate volatility will continue to be lim-
ited under the new operating procedures to be
implemented later this year in Canada when the
LVTS system is in place. In this new framework,
averaging will be eliminated. However, volatil-
ity will be limited by the new operating band,
whose bounds will be determined by the rates at
which settlement institutions can finance end-
of-day deficiencies or earn interest on settle-
ment balances.
35
Differences in liquidity mechanisms may also
explain why interest rate volatility has been
somewhat higher in the UK and New Zealand
than in Canada. Both the UK and New Zealand
have daily settlement balance requirements and
do not use averaging to limit volatility. In addi-
tion, neither country has formal interest rate
operating bands. In this environment, volatility
depends largely on the terms that the central
bank sets for providing additional liquidity. 
As discussed above, access to additional liquid-
ity from the central bank in both the United
Kingdom and in New Zealand has been influ-









ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 21are acceptable to the central bank and the sup-
plies of these assets (UK and New Zealand) as
well as on the range of acceptable counterparties
(UK). One reason that volatility has fallen recently
in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand
may be that the mechanism for providing liquid-
ity has become more flexible. The Bank of Eng-
land has made a number of changes in recent
years to broaden the range of assets acceptable
in transactions and has expanded the range of
counterparties. The Reserve Bank of New Zea-
land has also undertaken institutional reforms in
the money markets aimed at relieving liquidity
pressures.
36 By improving money market liquid-
ity, these institutional changes in the United
Kingdom and New Zealand may have contrib-
uted to reduced interest rate volatility.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
The experience of Canada, the United King-
dom, and New Zealand shows that monetary
policy can be conducted without the use of reserve
requirements and that interest rate volatility can
be managed by appropriate mechanisms for pro-
viding liquidity. In the United States, a continued
decline in reserve balances could result in increased
interest rate volatility. If greater interest rate
volatility became an impediment to monetary
policy, the Federal Reserve would have two policy
options: take actions to restore the effectiveness
of reserve requirements or adapt to a world of
lower reserve requirements by altering liquidity
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As discussed in our previous article, the United
States has not yet experienced a sustained increase
in interest rate volatility as reserve balances
have declined (Sellon and Weiner). Volatility
rose sharply, but only temporarily, after the Fed-
eral Reserve lowered reserve requirements in
1990.
37 And, despite the growing use of sweep
accounts, there is evidence of only a moderate
increase in volatility in recent years (Bennett
and Hilton).
There are two reasons for believing that vola-
tility could rise, however, if reserve balances
continue to decline. First, the nature of balances
held by depository institutions at the Federal
Reserve is gradually changing to reflect an
increased demand for payments needs rather
than reserve needs. To the extent that the demand
for Federal Reserve balances held for clearing
and settlement purposes is more variable and
more difficult to forecast than the demand for
reserve balances, interest rate volatility may rise.
38
A second reason for expecting increased vola-
tility results from the way that reserve require-
ment averaging is currently structured in the
United States. Under current averaging proce-
dures, a fall in reserve balances tends to reduce
the benefits of averaging. This occurs because
depository institutions are currently discour-
aged from having daily account overdrafts by
high fees and by administrative counseling. As
a result, a decline in reserve balances effectively
reduces the size of a reserve balance deficiency
that an institution can incur and use to offset
reserve surpluses during the averaging period.
For example, an institution facing an unexpected
surplus early in the averaging period may not be
able to incur enough reserve deficiencies later
in the period to offset the surplus without being
overdrawn at some point later in the period. In
this situation, an institution experiencing a large
surplus has an incentive to sell these funds rather
than hold them, resulting in downward pressure
on interest rates.
 39 Because of the restrictiveness
of current policy on daily overdrafts, a fall in
reserve balances effectively reduces the benefits
of averaging and reduces the interest sensitivity
of reserve demand. And, as illustrated in Figure
2, a reduced interest sensitivity of demand tends
to increase interest rate volatility.
Policy options 
Faced with the potential for higher interest
rate volatility as reserve balances fall, the Fed-
eral Reserve has two general strategies it could
pursue if it wishes to reduce volatility. One
option is to make regulatory changes that would
stem or even reverse the erosion of reserve bal-
ances. A second option is to adapt to a world of
lower reserve balances by making institutional
changes similar to those used in Canada, the UK,
and New Zealand so as to manage interest rate
volatility.
Maintain reserve requirements. As noted ear-
lier, the recent decline in reserve balances in the
United States is largely due to banks’ use of
sweep accounts designed to reduce required
reserves and lower the cost of reserve require-
ments. The most straightforward solution to this
problem would be for the Federal Reserve to pay
interest on reserve balances.
40 Paying interest on
reserves would offset the cost of holding idle
balances at the Federal Reserve and would reduce
the incentive to avoid reserve requirements. As
a result, payment of interest on reserves would
likely stop and, perhaps, reverse the recent ero-
sion in reserve balances. 
While the Federal Reserve has long supported
the payment of interest on reserves, it does not
currently have the legal authority to do so (Fein-
man). Over the years, the main obstacle to pay-
ment of interest on reserve balances has been the
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sury revenue. This revenue loss would occur
because part of the earnings on the Federal
Reserve System’s security portfolio would be
paid to depository institutions holding reserve
balances rather than being transferred to the
Treasury.
Without paying interest on reserves, the Fed-
eral Reserve is likely to have only limited ability
to stem the erosion in reserve balances. Concep-
tually, one stopgap measure might be to amend
Regulation D to prohibit the use of sweep accounts
or to limit their use. If the objective of this
measure is to limit volatility, outright prohibi-
tion may be too extreme, as it appears that
monetary policy is not impaired by the current
level of reserve balances. Thus, balancing the
cost of the reserve tax on depository institutions
against monetary policy efficiency would sug-
gest that actions to limit further erosion of
reserve balances may be preferable to mandat-
ing higher levels. 
A second approach to stem the decline in
reserve balances might be to reduce the ability
of depository institutions to use vault cash to
meet reserve requirements. Currently, deposi-
tory institutions can use 100 percent of their
vault cash to satisfy reserve requirements.
Reducing the proportion of vault cash that counts
for reserve purposes would force institutions to
hold higher reserve balances at the Federal Re-
serve. The Federal Reserve has altered the eligi-
bility of vault cash in the past (Feinman). For
example, in 1917, the Federal Reserve removed
the eligibility of vault cash to be used to satisfy
reserve requirements. Then, in 1959, the eligi-
bility of vault cash was restored in an attempt to
lower the reserve tax to prevent member banks
from leaving the Federal Reserve System.
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Although both of these methods could be tem-
porarily successful in increasing or maintaining
reserve balances, they are unlikely to provide a
permanent solution. Indeed, the recent develop-
ment of sweep accounts should not be seen as
an isolated event but as merely the latest method
used by depository institutions to evade the
reserve requirement tax. Thus, without the pay-
ment of interest on reserve balances, institutions
are likely to continue to have an incentive to
invent new methods of avoiding the reserve tax
and so undermine the effectiveness of reserve
requirements.
Adapt to lower reserve requirements. The
other option open to the Federal Reserve is to
adapt to a world of low and declining reserve
balances by taking actions to limit increased
interest rate volatility. One way to do this is to
enhance the benefits of reserve averaging. As
noted above, under the current institutional
structure of reserve requirements in the United
States, lower reserve balances reduce the inter-
est sensitivity of reserve demand and undermine
the benefits of averaging in lowering interest
rate volatility. One solution to this problem is to
expand the averaging period or the reserve car-
ryover provision to allow reserve deficiencies
and surpluses to be spread over a longer time
span.
42 A somewhat more radical approach
would be to change System policy on daily
overdrafts to allow institutions the flexibility to
include end-of-day overdrafts in the averaging
process.
43 In terms of the model presented
above, these institutional changes would have
the effect of increasing the interest sensitivity of
reserve demand and could offset the impact of
the decline in reserve balances.
The Federal Reserve could also limit interest
rate volatility by altering its procedures for sup-
plying liquidity. One approach would be to alter
the frequency of reserve provision through open
market operations. Normally, the trading desk at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York conducts
one open market operation per day. In contrast,
24 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYthe Bank of England has three regularly sched-
uled times at which it can conduct open market
operations during the day. This structure gives
the Bank of England flexibility in adjusting to
revised estimates of the size of the daily settle-
ment balance need and helps reduce rate volatil-
ity. Similarly, the Bank of Canada, under its
current operating procedures, can conduct open
market operations during the day to maintain the
overnight rate within its operating band.
An alternative way of increasing the flexibil-
ity of mechanisms for supplying liquidity is to
change the structure of the discount window.
Traditionally, the discount window has served
as the primary safety valve for depository insti-
tutions to adjust to reserve imbalances. How-
ever, the stabilizing function of the discount
window has diminished in recent years as
depository institutions have become increas-
ingly reluctant to borrow, perhaps because such
borrowing from the Federal Reserve is viewed
as an indication of an institution’s financial con-
dition. This increased reluctance to borrow means
that depository institutions are more likely to fund
a reserve shortfall in the market rather than
relying on discount window borrowing. 
A number of reform proposals for the discount
window have been advanced over the years.
44 Of
these proposals, the most promising way of
reducing interest rate volatility appears to be the
replacement of the current system with a Lom-
bard-type framework, such as that used in Ger-
many. In this framework, the discount rate
would be set at a penalty rate and administrative
restrictions on borrowing would be removed.
Interest rate volatility would be limited because
institutions would turn to the discount window
to meet a system shortage of central bank bal-
ances. In this type of system, the discount rate
would effectively set a ceiling on the overnight
rate as in Figure 4 above.
45 
At the same time, restructuring the discount
window would not limit downward movement
in the overnight rate. Thus, to reduce the range
of variation of the overnight rate, a separate
liquidity absorption mechanism would be
needed either in the form of a standing offer to
purchase excess balances at a fixed rate or an
explicit payment of interest on these balances.
46
The rate paid on these balances would serve as
a floor on the overnight rate, as shown in Figure
4. If the Federal Reserve were to use both of
these mechanisms, the resulting system would
be similar to the Canadian system, where a band
for the overnight rate serves to limit interest rate
volatility.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The sharp decline in reserve balances in the
United States in recent years has raised concerns
about the effectiveness of monetary policy in a
low reserves environment. Conceptually, two
monetary policy issues arise in a system in
which reserve requirements are not binding on
depository institutions. First, when the demand
for central bank balances arises from payments
needs rather than from reserve requirements,
changes in the structure of the payments system
may become an important factor in the design of
monetary policy operating procedures. Second,
as reserve requirements decline, short-term
interest rate volatility could increase either if the
demand for central bank balances becomes
more difficult to forecast or if the interest sensi-
tivity of this demand is reduced.
While these two issues are important concep-
tually, it is not clear how important or relevant
they are in practice. To assess their practical
importance, this article examined the experi-
ence of Canada, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand, three countries that have conducted
monetary policy without reserve requirements
for a number of years. The experience of these
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the structure of the payments system and monetary
policy in a world without reserve requirements.
In all three countries, recent changes in the pay-
ments system have had implications for monetary
policy operating procedures. At the same time,
however, the experience of these three countries
suggests that there need be little connection
between the absence of reserve requirements
and the degree of short-term interest rate vola-
tility. Rather, the volatility observed in these
countries appears to depend more on institu-
tional arrangements for providing and absorb-
ing liquidity than on the absence of reserve
requirements. 
If reserve balances continue to decline in the
United States, short-term interest rate volatility
could increase due to the declining effectiveness
of current reserve averaging procedures and,
perhaps, to increased difficulty in forecasting
the demand for reserve and settlement balances.
If rising volatility becomes a policy concern, the
Federal Reserve has two options. One approach
is for the Federal Reserve to pay interest on
reserve balances. Paying interest on reserves
would offset the cost of holding idle balances at
the Federal Reserve and would reduce the incen-
tive to avoid reserve requirements. As a result,
payment of interest on reserves would likely
stop and, perhaps, reverse the recent erosion in
reserve balances. The second approach is to
adapt to a world of low reserve balances by
altering the institutional framework for provid-
ing and absorbing liquidity. If the Federal
Reserve chooses this second option, it may
benefit from the experience of countries that
have already adapted to a world without reserve
requirements.
ENDNOTES
1 While reserve requirements typically apply to demand or
transactions accounts, savings accounts and other
short-term bank liabilities may also be subject to reserve
requirements. In the United States, the basic structure of
reserve requirements is set out in the Monetary Control Act
of 1980, and the Federal Reserve’s authority to adjust
reserve requirements is limited by this legislation.
Depository institutions in the United States currently face a 10
percent reserve requirement on transactions account balances
in excess of $49.3 million and a 3 percent requirement on
transactions balances of $0 to $49.3 million. There is an
exemption for smaller institutions set out in the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 that limits the
amount of transactions balances subject to the 3 percent
requirement. Currently, there are no reserve requirements on
nonpersonal time deposits or eurocurrency liabilities.
2 In the United States, reserves are maintained over a
two-week period based on the level of transactions deposits
also averaged over a two-week period. Additionally, in the
United States, depository institutions are allowed to carry
over part of a reserve deficiency or surplus into the next
maintenance period.
3 In a “sweep” arrangement, funds are automatically
transferred from reservable deposit accounts, such as
demand deposits and other checkable deposits, to
nonreservable accounts, such as money market deposit
accounts. Such a transfer lowers the deposit base for the
calculation of reserve requirements. The use of sweep
accounts by banks began modestly in 1994 but has
increased considerably since the spring of 1995.
4 In both systems, the demand for central bank balances
will also be influenced by the opportunity cost of holding
these balances. This opportunity cost is influenced both by
alternative earning opportunities for central bank balances
and by price incentives set by the central bank for balance
excesses and deficiencies. For further discussion, see
Clinton (1997).
5 In the United States, as required reserve balances have
fallen, many depository institutions have found that their
remaining reserve balances at the Federal Reserve are no
longer sufficient for handling payments needs. As a result,
many institutions have increased their holding of so-called
“clearing balances” to handle their payments needs (Sellon
and Weiner). However, unlike reserve balances, which
depend on the level of deposits, the demand for clearing
balances depends on an institution’s use of Federal Reserve
26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYpriced services (Stevens). As a result, this demand is likely
to be behaviorally different from the demand for reserves.
6 Another example is the shift by many countries from
payments systems based on net settlement to real time gross
settlement systems. In net settlement systems, interbank
settlement is generally made on a net basis at the end of a
business day. In a real time gross settlement system, each
transaction is settled separately during the day. Thus, net
settlement systems generally require that institutions hold
smaller balances than in gross settlement systems. As a
result, a change in the method of settlement of interbank
transactions may affect the demand for settlement balances.
7 Formally, the Bank of Canada uses a “monetary
conditions index” (MCI) as their operational target. The
MCI is a combination of a short-term interest rate and the
exchange rate; for details, see Freedman.
8 The central bank must also be able to forecast nonpolicy
factors affecting the supply of settlement balances. For
further discussion, see Sellon and Weiner.
9 Prior to the elimination of reserve requirements, the Bank
of Canada limited access to lending by administrative
restrictions similar to those applying to use of the Federal
Reserve’s discount window. Borrowing was also
discouraged by a rising marginal cost based on the
frequency of borrowing. With the elimination of reserve
requirements, administrative restrictions were removed
and borrowing from the Bank of Canada is now based
purely on cost considerations.
10 Because institutions pay the Bank Rate on a daily deficit
and then must hold an offsetting positive balance later in
the averaging period, the cost of an overdraft is
approximately twice the Bank Rate.
11 For more discussion of these operations, see Clinton and
Fettig.
12 Such a transfer of government balances, termed the
“drawdown/redeposit mechanism,” is performed at the end
of the day and, by itself, would not be sufficient to keep the
overnight rate within the operating band during the day.
13 For more details, see Clinton (1991).
14 Some small-dollar, paper-based transactions will continue
to settle retroactively. For discussion, see Bank of Canada.
15 Repurchase agreements will be used as a means of
indicating a target rate within the operating band. For more
details, see Clinton (1997).
16 In anticipation of moving to the new framework, in
February 1996, the Bank of Canada set the Bank Rate at
the upper limit of the current operating range for the
overnight rate. Previously, the Bank Rate was tied to the
3-month Treasury bill rate.
17 Dealing rates for eligible bills are established for four
maturity bands ranging from 1-14 days to 64-91 days.
18 Liquidity strains following the ERM crisis in 1992
caused the Bank of England to evaluate its methods for
providing money market liquidity (King).
19 Eligible bills are commercial bills of exchange accepted
by a bank whose acceptances are eligible for discount at the
Bank of England. For more details, see Bank of England
(1997).
20 In addition, under the new arrangements, the Bank of
England operates over a narrower range of maturities and,
on average, at a shorter maturity.
21 This type of intraday repurchase facility is less necessary
in Canada because the LVTS is a net settlement system and
so requires less intraday liquidity.
22 Reserve Bank bills are discount securities, similar to
Treasury bills, issued by the Reserve Bank. Their sole
purpose is to be used in transactions with the Reserve Bank.
These bills have an original maturity of 63 days and can be
discounted on demand at the Reserve Bank to obtain
settlement cash if they have 28 or fewer remaining days to
maturity. The rate on these transactions is reset daily at a
penalty margin of 90 basis points above market rates for
other short-term securities. For more details, see Huxford
and Reddell.
23 The settlement cash rate is set daily at a margin 300 basis
points below the seven-day cash rate. Interest is paid only
on the first $20 million in each bank’s settlement account.
This restriction was put in place to reduce interest rate
volatility and to prevent banks from attempting to
manipulate short-term rates by accumulating a large
settlement cash position and forcing competitors to resort
to the discount window.
24 The Reserve Bank can also change monetary policy by
altering the supply of Reserve Bank bills, the penalty
margin, or the rate paid on settlement cash. For more
details, see Huxford and Reddell.
25 For a discussion of these changes, see Reserve Bank of
New Zealand.
ECONOMIC REVIEW · SECOND QUARTER 1997 2726 For a detailed discussion of the payments system
changes in New Zealand and associated changes in
monetary policy operations, see Tait.
27 As this article was being prepared, the Reserve Bank had
published a discussion paper outlining possible changes but
had not taken action on this proposal.
28 While a comparison of volatility across countries is
illustrative, it can mask country-specific factors. For
example, some of the volatility early in the period in the
Canadian overnight rate probably reflects the fact that the
Bank of Canada, at that time, was focusing more on the
3-month rate than on the overnight rate. Similarly, the Bank
of England has traditionally influenced rates at a variety of
short-term maturities rather than focusing exclusively on
the overnight rate. In addition, all three countries are open
economies where exchange rate stability may be as
important as interest rate volatility. In some instances,
greater interest rate volatility may result from attempts to
reduce exchange rate variability. Also, changes in volatility
may result from changes in the institutional structure of
financial markets. For example, the decline in volatility in
the UK in 1996 coincides with the introduction of an open
gilt repo market which may have made it easier for
institutions without bill holdings to redistribute liquidity
among themselves. Nevertheless, the recent low level of
volatility in the overnight rate in all three countries is
noteworthy in countering the claim that low reserve
requirements are associated with higher interest rate
volatility.
29 Independent of the size of a system surplus or shortage,
volatility may also depend partly on the distribution of
settlement balances among settlement banks and on the
existence of market power exerted by institutions. A
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this article.
30 Note that the relevance of this effect is an empirical issue
whose importance may vary by country depending on the
institutional structure of the settlement system.
31 In practice, the effect of averaging on demand is likely
to be considerably more complicated than shown in this
figure. For example, on the last day of an averaging period,
there may be no further opportunity to carry forward
surpluses or deficiencies so that the demand curve is
vertical. Also, institutions may find it difficult to work off
large imbalances occurring early in the period so that the
benefits of averaging are attenuated. For a discussion of
these and related issues, see Borio.
32 This point is sometimes unclear in discussions of reserve
requirements and volatility where a comparison is made
between a system of positive reserve requirements with
averaging and a system of zero reserve requirements
without averaging. Volatility may be lower in the first
system, not because of the existence of reserve
requirements, but because of averaging. The central bank’s
policies with regard to end-of-day overdrafts may also
affect volatility. It should be noted that to implement
averaging in a system without reserve requirements, the
central bank must permit end-of-day overdrafts
(collateralized) in order for there to be something to be
averaged over time. For a more detailed discussion of
averaging, see Bindseil.
33 How the overnight rate would be determined within this
band is difficult to illustrate as it would depend on
institutional factors, such as the distribution of settlement
balances among settlement banks and central bank
operations to provide or absorb liquidity during the day.
34 Canada has 12 bank and nonbank direct clearers, the UK
has 15 clearing banks, and New Zealand has 11 banks with
settlement accounts at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
35 Then, as now, clearing institutions will have a strong
incentive to target a zero settlement balance.
36 In 1991, several changes were made to improve the
functioning of the interbank market. These changes
included a decrease in the size of the discount margin, an
increase in the supply of Reserve Bank bills coupled with
a reduction in their initial term to maturity, a reduction in
the cash target, and other institutional changes.
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has not increased as required reserve balances have
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established required clearing balances as a partial offset.
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limited by their structure. Clearing accounts pay implicit
interest in the form of offsets to the cost of Federal Reserve
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However, many institutions appear to have reached the
maximum size of clearing balances warranted by their use
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